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I. 
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
Amicus ANR Production Company, amicus CIG Exploration, Inc., and amicus Coastal 
Oil & Gas Corporation (collectively "Coastal") are each Delaware corporations qualified to do 
business in the State of Utah. Each of amici hold oil and gas leases issued by the Division of 
Lands and Forestry of the Department of Natural Resources of the State of Utah (the "Division") 
covering and affecting public lands owned by the State. CIG Exploration, Inc. and Coastal Oil 
& Gas Corporation are currently parties to a proceeding pending before the Division concerning 
the precise issues presented in this case, that is, whether royalties are owed to the State of Utah 
under applicable law for reimbursed ad valorem and severance taxes. By Order dated January 
26, 1994, this Court granted Coastal leave to file its Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing. 
II. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Pursuant to Rule 35, Ut. R. App. P., Coastal respectfully joins in the Petition for 
Rehearing filed by plaintiff/appellant Enron Oil & Gas Company ("Enron") filed on even date 
herewith. Coastal submits this Brief in Support of the Petition for Rehearing on the grounds that 
the Majority Opinion, dated January 5, 1993 (the "Majority Opinion"), entered in the above-
referenced matter, misapprehends both points of law and fact and, for the reasons set forth 
below, should be reversed. This Brief in Support of the Petition for Rehearing is presented in 
good faith and not for delay. 
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III. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
(i) Did the District Court, and the Majority Opinion, err in finding that "value" in Utah 
Code Ann. § 65-1-18 (1953) (repealed 1988) includes ad valorem tax reimbursements which 
Enron received for the sale of its own production and in finding that such tax reimbursements 
are therefore subject to royalty? 
(ii) Did the District Court, and the Majority Opinion, err in finding that the reference 
to "market value" in the royalty clauses contained in the oil and gas leases subject to this dispute 
included ad valorem tax reimbursements which Enron received for its own production and in 
finding that such reimbursements were therefore subject to royalty? 
(iii) Did the Majority Opinion err in finding that royalty payments to the State of Utah 
must be no less than royalty payments to the federal government under federal leases? 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Leases are Contracts. Nothing in the Contracts Provide for Royalties on Tax 
Reimbursements, and the Court Should Not Imply What the Parties Did Not 
Intend or That the Legislature has not Granted. 
The leases are contracts which govern the relationship between Enron and the Division 
in regards to the payment of royalties. See, Freston v. Gulf Oil Co,, 565 P.2d 787 (Utah 1977). 
Absent express contractual language evidencing the parties' intent or a statute evidencing 
legislative intent to include tax reimbursements in the market value of natural gas for royalty 
purposes, the Court should not do so. Yet, not only did the Majority Opinion fail to point to 
contractual or legislative intent for valuing tax reimbursements for royalty purposes, more 
importantly, the Majority Opinion fails to discuss or to give effect to the expressed intent of 
Enron and the Division as evidenced by these leases. 
The Majority Opinion recites that, "[tjhere is a long-standing practice of gas producers 
requiring gas purchasers to pay tax reimbursements." (Majority Opinion at page 4). Given that 
long-standing practice, the Division could have simply and clearly included a provision in the 
leases requiring payment of royalties on any tax reimbursements. The Division, however, failed 
to include any such provision in the context of gas sales. 
The leases, which were prepared by the Division or its predecessor, provide that: 
GAS - LESSEE also agrees to pay LESSOR Twelve and One Half 
Percent (YlVi%) of the reasonable market value at the well of all 
gas produced and saved or sold from the leased premises. Where 
gas is sold under a contract, and such contract has been approved 
in whole or conditionally by the LESSOR, the reasonable market 
value of such gas for the purpose of determining the royalties 
payable hereunder shall be the price at which the production is 
sold, provided that in no event shall the price for gas be less than 
that received by the United States of America for its royalties from 
gas of like grade and quality from the same field. 
This paragraph represents the total agreement between Enron and the Division pertaining to 
royalties, and there is no reference to payment of royalties on tax reimbursements. 
That the Division could have included such a provision in the leases is underscored by 
the fact the same leases do provide for royalties on extra payments in the context of oil sales. 
In reference to the sale of oil, the lease provides: 
When paid in money, the royalties shall be calculated upon the 
reasonable market value of the oil at the well, including any 
subsidy or extra payment which the lessees or any successor in 
interest thereto, may receive, without regard as to whether such 
subsidy or extra payment shall be made in the nature of money or 
other consideration,...." 
(Emphasis added). The Division specifically included "extra payments" made to the Lessee for 
royalty purposes on the sale of oil. The Division could have used, but failed to use, similar 
language in the paragraph dealing with the sale of gas. That ambiguity must be construed 
against the Division as the drafter of the leases. Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 669 
P.2d 410 (Utah 1983); Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982). 
At the time the leases were executed, it was not the intent of the parties that royalties be 
paid on ad valorem tax reimbursements. No statute, state or otherwise, requires or provides for 
the valuation of tax reimbursements for royalty purposes. Consequently, the Court should not 
imply what the parties or the legislature have not granted. See, BelNorth Petroleum Co. v. Tax 
Comm'n, 845 P.2d 266, 270 (Ut. App. 1993). 
B, The "Federal Floor" Allegedly Established by the Leases does not Mandate 
Inclusion of Ad Valorem Tax Reimbursements as Part of Value for 
Determining Royalties. 
The Majority Opinion mistakenly relies upon the alleged "federal floor" lease provision 
and concludes that the state must receive as much in royalties as the federal government 
receives. This conclusion is wrong. 
The leases provide that "in no event shall the price for gas be less than that [the price] 
received by the Unites States of America for its royalties from gas of like grade and quality from 
the same field." The grammatical antecedent of "that" is "price," not royalties. There is 
nothing in the leases which requires that royalty payments be the same. Moreover, there is 
nothing in the leases or Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-18 that requires, or even authorizes, inclusion 
of tax reimbursements for calculating royalties. To the contrary, the leases and section 65-1-18 
require that tax reimbursements be excluded from the royalty calculations. 
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This conclusion, is the only sound one, for several reasons. First, ad valorem taxes are, 
by definition, taxes "imposed on the value of property." Black's Law Dictionary 25 (5th Ed. 
1983). The ad valorem tax itself is calculated by determining the value of the property. 
Payment of these taxes does not suddenly increase the value of the property. Instead, the taxes 
merely add to the costs associated with the property. BelNorth Petroleum Corp. at 270, n.7. 
Second, reimbursed taxes are included in calculating royalties on federal leases because 
there is a specific federal regulation which authorizes such inclusion. 30 C.F.R. § 221.47 states: 
The value of production, for purposes of computing royalty shall 
be the estimated reasonable value of the product as determined by 
the supervisor, due consideration being given to the highest price 
paid for a part or for a majority of production of like quality in the 
same field, to the price received by the Lessee, to posted prices 
and to other relevant matters. Under no circumstances shall the 
value of production of any of said substances for the purposes of 
computing royalty be deemed to be less than the gross proceeds 
accruing to the Lessee from the sale thereof or less than the value 
computed on such reasonable unit value as shall have been 
determined by the secretary. 
The federal cases addressing the royalty question have their genesis in this regulation. It is this 
regulation which authorizes the federal government to impose a royalty on two or more 
components of compensation. For this reason, in Hoover & Bracken Energies, Inc. v. United 
States Department of Interior, 723 F.2d 1488, 1492 (10th Cir. 1983), the Tenth Circuit stated 
"what is the value of production? Is it contract price, or contract price plus severance? The 
latter is the value of production for payment of royalties." The Court allowed royalties on both 
the contract price and the severance, because the federal government was entitled to a royalty 
on the gross proceeds, not merely the contract price, by virtue of regulation. 
It is well settled that an administrative body of the State of Utah cannot act contrary to 
or beyond the scope of the statute from which that body draws its power. See, State v. 
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Chindren, 111 P.2d 527, 529 (Utah App. 1989); Crowther v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 762 
P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah App. 1988). Nothing in Utah Code Ann. §65-1-18 authorizes 
incorporation of federal regulations into the State of Utah's statutory royalty framework. 
Instead, section 65-1-18 mandates that royalties cannot exceed a statutory cap of 12.5% of the 
value of the gas, and nothing in the lease can be construed to circumvent or augment that 
statutory cap. Thus, even if the leases purport to incorporate the federal regulatory and statutory 
framework, such lease provisions would have no effect, because the Division has no statutory 
authority to accomplish that end. It is simply too large a stretch to argue that payment of taxes 
imposed by the State of Utah creates additional value upon which a royalty in favor of the State 
of Utah can be assessed. Therefore, the assessment of royalties on ad valorem tax 
reimbursements exceeds the statutory cap authorized by the legislature and, therefore, should 
not be approved by this Court. 
C. The Majority Opinion is Inconsistent with Established Utah Law Providing 
that Tax Reimbursements are not Part of the Value of Production. 
The issue before this Court was whether the market value of the gas included the taxes 
assessed against the production of that gas and reimbursed to Enron by the gas purchasers. The 
issue of whether the value of gas includes tax reimbursements to Enron on these very same 
leases has already been decided by the Utah Court of Appeals. Contrary to the decision in this 
case, the Court of Appeals held that tax reimbursements do not constitute part of the value of 
the gas. The Utah Supreme Court denied certiorari. Tax Comm'n v. Enron Oil & Gas Co., 859 
P.2d 585 (Utah 1993). 
InBelNorth Petroleum Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 845 P.2d 266 (Utah App. 1993), the 
Auditing Division of the State Tax Commission issued a Notice of Deficiency to Enron on the 
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leases involved in this case, asserting that Enron was required to pay occupation taxes on the 
ad valorem tax reimbursement. The applicable statute, Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-67, levies a tax 
of two percent on the "value" of natural gas "at the well." According to this statute, "the value 
at the well shall be the value established under a bona fide contract for the purchase of the 
same." Id. 
The Utah Department of Natural Resources advances the same argument in this case as 
the Tax Commission made in BelNorth, namely that the value should include "all forms of 
compensation received by [Enron] in exchange for the sale of its gas," including tax 
reimbursements. The unanimous panel rejected this reasoning holding that although the value 
of the gas is established by the gas purchase agreement, the value of the gas is not necessarily 
the total value of the consideration flowing under the natural gas contract. Instead: 
the gross amount Enron receives under such contracts actually has 
at least two relevant elements: (1) consideration given for the gas; 
and (2) consideration given for other elements of the contract, such 
as contractual rights. 
Id. at 269. 
In this case, the majority opinion discounts this reasoning as "not in accord with 
economic realities."1 Majority Opinion at p. 7. As stated by the majority: 
Enron concedes that the market value of gas is the highest 
price that a willing buyer would agree to pay a willing seller. The 
stated price is not, however, the sole measure of market value in 
this case. Severance taxes are a cost to production for the 
producer. Shifting that cost to the buyer by a tax reimbursement 
is simply additional consideration to the seller. In short, the stated 
price plus tax reimbursements constitutes the consideration that a 
*In support of this reasoning, the majority stated that there is "no practical difference between consideration for the gas and consideration 
for a commitment to a long-term contracts " This is because gas is "typically sold pursuant to long-term contracts " (Majority Opinion at p 
7 ) Actually, the record is devoid of any evidence suggesting that gas is typically sold on long-term contracts Rather, there is a very active 
spot market in natural gas, the price of which typically differs from the consideration under a long-term contract 
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willing buyer pays a willing seller and together they equal the 
"reasonable market value" of the gas. 
The BelNorth decision rejected this logic. As to whether taxes added to the value of an item, 
the Court stated that: 
The reimbursements are therefore only a transfer from Enron to its 
purchasers of an artificial cost of doing business imposed by the 
State in order to raise revenue, not an actual cost of production. 
Taxes simply do not add value to an item: thev may add cost, but 
not value. 
Id. at 270, n. 7 (emphasis added). 
Although the BelNorth decision involved the occupation tax and this case involves 
royalties, the underlying rationale of the cases are irreconcilable. For the reasons set forth in 
this Brief, BelNorth sets forth the preferred rationale. 
D. The District Court's Summary Judgment Was not Affirmed by the Necessary 
Majority of the Court. 
On January 5, 1993, the Majority Opinion and dissenting opinion were filed with the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. In the Majority Opinion, Justices Stewart, 
Howe, and Hall affirmed a district court order granting summary judgment (the "Summary 
Judgment") in favor of the Division. The Summary Judgment affirmed the Division's 
assessment of royalties on ad valorem tax reimbursements paid to Enron by the purchasers of 
its gas. Justices Durham and Zimmerman filed a strong dissent. 
Former Chief Justice Hall retired from the Court on December 31, 1993, prior to the 
entry by the clerk of the Majority Opinion. Rule 30(c), Ut. R. App. P., provides that: 
When a judgment, decree, or order is reversed, modified, or 
affirmed, the reason shall be stated concisely in writing and filed 
with the clerk. Any justice or judge concurring or dissenting may 
likewise give reasons in writing and file the same with the clerk. 
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The entry by the clerk in the records of the court shall constitute 
the entry of the judgment of the court. (Emphasis added.) 
Accordingly, under the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Majority Opinion did not become 
effective until after Justice Hall had no authority to participate in the opinion. Unless the 
Supreme Court specifically authorized Justice Hall to perform judicial functions after his 
retirement pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-5(2) (1992), Justice Hall had no power to join 
in the Majority Opinion. While no Utah case has been decided on this point, cases in Colorado 
and Nevada make it very clear that a retired judge or justice, not assigned to serve on the case, 
cannot participate in a decision, even if the participation largely occurs prior to the retirement 
of that judge or justice. Merchants Mortg. & Trust Corp. v. Jenkins, 659 P.2d 691 (Colo. 
1983)(former judge does not have authority to act in a judicial capacity, and orders entered after 
he ceases to be a judge are void); Fox v. Fox, 441 P.2d 678 (Nevada 1968)(even if judges 
position is known prior to expiration of term, findings of fact, conclusions of law and divorce 
decree filed nine days after said expiration are void). Since only four of the justices who made 
the decision in this case were qualified to do so, and only two of those Justices affirmed the 
Summary Judgment, the Summary Judgment cannot be affirmed, and the matter should be 
reheard. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
Amid respectfully submits that the Majority Opinion is premised upon legal conclusions 
which are both contrary to the terms of the leases governing the relationships between Enron and 
the Division, and contrary to the statute which empowers the Division to collect royalties on 
behalf of the State. Moreover, the Majority Opinion is inconsistent with established law in the 
State of Utah which holds that ad valorem tax reimbursements are not part of the value of the 
ST P1 . STVFPTT- 1 7 1 6 2 1 0 
gas. Finally, because the Majority Opinion was not entered until after Justice Hall's retirement, 
the Majority Opinion does not have the requisite majority to affirm the Summary Judgment. 
WHEREFORE, Coastal respectfully joins in the request that this Court grant rehearing 
on this case and rule in favor of Enron reversing the decision of the District Court. 
DATED this 2nd day of February, 1994. 
SNELL & 
Phillip 1 
Blake D 
Jeffrey T. Sivertsen, Esq. 
Attorneys for Amid Curiae 
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